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CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS
Abraham Lincoln ia often remembered ae a brilliant states­
man with a grand plan to reunite North and South after the bitter 
Civil War. While Lincoln was, undoubtably, a skilled politician 
the question still remains— did Lincoln really have a concrete, 
long term reconstruction plan? In order to answer this question 
one must understand the goals and ideals of Lincoln during his 
administration and his attitude toward the South. After investi­
gating these topics, it will be easier to see whether Lincoln 
ever intended to have a definite plan and, if so, whether he 
succeeded in meeting his goals.
Lincoln considered the issues of reconstruction from the 
very beginning of the war. Fundamental to his view on this 
subject was a belief that secession was unwarranted by the 
Constitution and, therefore, had never taken place. Many of 
Lincoln's southern policies stemmed from this basic assumption.
In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln revealed his conviction 
that, "no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get 
out of the Union,— that resolves and ordinances to that effect 
are legally void."1. Assuming that the rebellious states wore 
still in the Union, Lincoln treated the citisens of the South 
simply as disloyal Americans rather than enemy foreigners.
Unlike many Radical Republicans, Lincoln never advocated
2returning southern states to territorial status and forcing 
them to go through a difficult re-entry program. Lincoln's 
assumption that the South had remained in the Union shaped his 
views on Presidential power and the existence of Union loyalty 
in the rebel states, and intensified his coimitment to finding 
an expedient end to the division among Americans.
It is often said that Abraham Lincoln was responsible 
for the expansion of the power of the President that has con­
tinued until today. Acting upon his own, without the approval 
of Congress on a number of occasions, Lincoln felt that the 
emergency situations raised by the war demanded quick, decisive 
action. In his message to Congress on July 4, 1861, for example, 
Lincoln defended his suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus 
while Congress was not in session. He explained that:
Mow it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive 
is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself, 
is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; 
and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous 
emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the 
instrument intended, that in every case, the danger 
should run its course, until Congress could be called 
together . . .2
Establishing his independence of Congress end his belief in the 
extensive power of the Presidency, Lincoln, early in his 
administration, laid the groundwork for his future control over 
reconstruction plans.
Extending his belief that the South had never seceded 
and was simply in a state of rebellion, Lincoln perceived much 
of his power in regard to the South as steaming from the 
Constitution. In a letter written to a group of Mew York
Democrats in June 1863, Lincoln once again defended his suspen­
sion of the writ of Habeas Corpus and other actions such as 
censorship which were taker, as war measures. Lincoln wrote,
3
"Ours is a case of Rebellion . . . and the provision of the
Constitution that 'The priviledge of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or
Invasion, the public safety may require it' is the provision
3which especially applies to our present case." Early in his 
Presidency, then, Lincoln established bothhis independence of 
Congress and his willingness to expand the provisions of the 
Constitution to the fullest extent. Having laid the ground­
work, Lincoln felt justified in expanding the Presidential 
power to pardon to be a central feature of his reconstruction 
program.
Though he extended Presidential power to unprecedented 
proportions, Lincoln did not wish to accomplish the reconstruc­
tion of the South by placing Northern unionists in positions of 
power. Foreseeing the potential difficulties which would be 
involved in interfering with local politics, Lincoln declared 
that "there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers" 
among southerners in order to restore their loyal status in the 
Union.* As his reconstruction program developed, Lincoln 
adhered to this early statement and promoted the use of loyal 
unionist men to form new governments as often as possible.
President Lincoln's attitude toward the South contributed 
a great deal toward the way in which he decided to use his power
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to restore the Union. Early in the war, Lincoln expressed his 
belief that most Southerners were not truly disloyal or in 
support of secession. They had, he felt, been decei/ed by a 
few corrupt leaders who had somehow convinced them to renounce 
their loyalty to the Union. In his July 4, 1861 message to 
Congress Lincoln described how these dishonest leaders had 
lured Southerners into rebellion. "Accordingly they commenced 
by an insidious debauching of the public mind." Lincoln 
theorized, "they invented an ingenious sophism which, if 
conceded, was followed by perfectly logical steps . . .  to the 
complete destruction of the U n i o n . C o n v i n c e d  that most 
Southerners had been duped and, in their hearts, truly remained 
loyal to the Union, Lincoln went on to declare that, "It may 
well be questioned whether there is, to-day, a majority of 
legally qualified voters of any state, except perhaps South 
Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe 
that the Union men are tha mirority in many if not every other 
one, of the so-called seceded States."^ Lincoln's early con­
fidence in the loyalty of a majority of southern citizens 
shaped the way he later developed his reconstruction plans. 
Believing in an underlying Unionism existing throughout the 
South, Lincoln was able to adopt a more forgiving attitude
7toward Southerners.
Unlike others of his party, Lincoln did not feel a strong 
prejudice toward the South and had always promoted a eoncillia- 
tory, compromising attitude toward the slave states. In his
5campaign apaech at the Cooper Institute in February, 1860,
Lincoln told Republicans that, "Even though the southern people
will not as much as listen to us, let us calmly consider their
demands and yield to them if, in our deliberate view of our
0duty, we possibly can." Never vehemently anti-South, Lincoln
constantly tried to reassure Southerners that he was not
attempting to usurp their power and that if they reconciled
with the Union, their slaves would not be taken from them.
He did not perceive the Southerners as evil or entirely at
fault for slavery and the resulting conflict over it. Lincoln
reminded Congress in 1862 that:
The people of the South are not more responsible for the 
introduction of this property [slaves] than are the people 
of the North; and when it is remembered how unhesitatingly 
we all use cotton and sugar, and share the profits of 
dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say, that the 
South has been more responsible than the North for its 
continuance.9
Willing to share the blame for slavery with the Southerners and 
confident in their inherent loyalty to the Union, Lincoln 
developed a trusting, lenient policy of reconstruction. 
Interested chiefly in restoring unity to the nation, Lincoln 
aimed not to punish the South but rather to reunite it with the 
North in the most expedient and efficient way possible.
At the beginning of the war, Congress and the President 
were in agreement over what war aims should be. in July, 1861, 
the Legislature adopted the Crittenden Resolution which had 
been developed by Kentucky's John Crittenden. The resolution 
established that the war was not waged "in any spirit of
6
oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or s tjugation, or 
purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or 
established institutes of those states."*® Lincoln endsrsed 
the resolution which reinforced his assurances to the South 
that the war was not being fought in order to end slavery.
When Lincoln decided to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on 
January 1, 1863, he did so only as a last resort. The war had 
not been going well for the Union and Lincoln realized some 
drastic measures needed to be taken. In issuing the Emancipa­
tion Proclamation and forever changing the war aims, then, 
Lincoln aimed to help the Union end the war sooner. Contrary 
to his "Great Emancipator" reputation, Lincoln did not issue 
the proclamation because of a profound sense of duty to end 
slavery but, rather, because he felt it would weaken the South. 
"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do 
it," Lincoln wrote to the editor of the New York Times, Horace 
Greely, "and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving 
others alone I would also do that."** Lincoln's commitment to 
expediency in ending the war and returning the South to its 
previous status contributed a great deal to his willingness to 
be flexible in his reconstruction programs. Not rigidly 
adhering to any one plan, Lincoln allowed reconstruction plans 
to evolve through time whenever he felt a change would return 
the South faster. Stating his willingness to modify the 
restoration plan he had just announced Lincoln assured Congress 
that, "Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented
7in a specific way, it is not said it will never be accepted in
12any other way.” Rather than demanding that his plan was the 
only one possible, the President expressed his willingness to be 
flexible early in the reconstruction process.
8CHAPTER II
LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION OF AMNESTY AND RECONSTRUCTION
While Abraham Lincoln had been considering the problem 
of reconstruction since the beginning of the war, it did not 
become a major political issue until the fall of 1863. At that 
time, Union victories in vital areas of the South stirred new 
hope that the war would end soon and emphasised the need for a 
plan to restore newly captured areas to the Union. In late 1862 
and early 1863, the Union continued to suffer defeat on the 
battlefield. Morale in the North dropped and southern 
restoration was only a remote theoretical topic. The summer of 
1863, however, brought a major turning point in the Union cause. 
With July victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and fall victor­
ies at Chattanooga and Lookout Mountain, the Union successfully 
consolidated its hold in southern territories and began a series 
of military triumphs. As a result of these northern accomplish­
ments, the entire Mississippi River was controlled by the North, 
thereby cutting the Western section of the Confederacy off from 
that of the East. Lincoln explained the implications of the 
1863 victories to Congress on December 8, 1863, "The rebel 
borders are pressed still further back, and by the complete 
opening of the Mississippi, the country dominated by the 
rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical 
communication between them."1 With Arkansas, Tennessee, the
9Delta region of Louisiana and some sections of Mississippi
virtually cleared of rebel influences, it became practical to
2begin serious restoration programs in those areas.
When military developments made the end of the war seem 
possible, Congress began to discuss the measures that would be 
taken toward the South, assuming the Union was victorious. A 
number of bills suggesting various methods of reconstruction 
were introduced in the fall of 1863. These bills stimulated 
discussion in both houses of Congress over how the South should 
be readmitted and what status the southern states would have 
after the war. As discussion over the proper method of recon­
struction progressed, it became clear that the central issue 
involved was whether restoration of the full rights of a 
rebellious state should depend upon the emancipation of slaves 
within that state. Conservatives, consisting mainly of Demo­
crats aud seme Republicans, advocated the readmission of southern 
states without any conditions, but especially without the 
abolition of slavery. The more Radical Republicans insist id that 
restoration of the rebel states to their full rights be con­
tingent upon the development of new state constitutions which 
would emancipate slaves immediately. In the course of investi­
gating the political aspects of the restoration issue, historian 
Herman Bale discovered that while most Radical Republicans agreed 
that emancipation should be the basis of any reconstruction plan, 
they offered three different theories regarding the implementa­
tion and oonsequonces of such a plan. Massachusetts Senator
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Charles Sumner was the chief spokesman for the Radical faction 
which supported a territorial approach toward the rebel states. 
In a speech published in the Atlantic Monthly in October, 1863, 
Sumner maintained that, "the whole rebel region, deprived of all 
local government, lapses under the exclusive jurisdiction of
3Congress precisely as any territory." According to Sumner and 
his followers, the rebel states must prove themselves worthy in 
order to become part of the Union again. William Whiting, the 
legal advisor to the War Department, took an even more extreme 
position on reconstruction. The robel states, he felt, should 
be treated not as territories but as alien land, subject to 
complete Federal control. He felt that the war had obliterated 
all state lines in the South and that the government should 
eventually form new states with whatever borders it determined 
appropriate. The most moderate of these three Radical theories 
was expressed, surprisingly, by Congressman Henry Winter Davis 
of Maryland, who would later challenge Lincoln's restoration 
plan. Davis and his followers felt that the states should not 
be reduced to territories or treated as alien land but, rather, 
that they must be recognized by Congress in order to function 
as a state again. Expressing his views in a Philadelphia speech 
in September, 1863, Davis claimed that, "the States . . . [were] 
continuing, perpetual elements of our Union, and their citizens 
always beneath the Constitution."^ During the fall of 1863, 
when all of these theories were emerging, it became clear that 
Lincoln would probably make some statement regarding restoration
11
in his upcoming Annual Message to Congress. Aware of the proba­
bility of a December announcement, the various factions of the 
Radicals and Conservatives attempted to press their opinions on 
President Lincoln. The plan for restoration which Lincoln did 
indeed announce in his annual message contained aspects of both
ethe Radical and Conservative programs.
On December 8, 1863, Abraham Lincoln issues his Procla­
mation of Amnesty and Reconstruction as well as his Annual 
Message to Congress. The latter included a detailed explanation 
of the proclamation and the basis upon which he assumed the power 
to issue it. The proclamation invited all former rebels who 
qualified, to sign a loyalty oath and reaffirm their allegiance 
to the Union.
The President based his power to issue such a broad 
pardon on two documents: the Constitution and Congress' Con­
fiscation Act of July 1862. In his proclamation Lincoln 
explained that the Constitution of the United States provided 
that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and 
pardo.is for offences against the United States, except in cases 
of impeachment . . ."” Lincoln found further justification for 
his sweeping action in the 1862 Confiscation Act which stated 
that the President was "authorised at any time thereafter, by 
proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in 
the existing Rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon 
and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such 
conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare.”7
12
Extending the power which the Constitution and Congress gave hint* 
to the fullest extent, Lincoln brought reconstruction under the 
direction of the executive. He did, however, acknowledge that 
Congress had the right to deny the admission of Senators and 
Representatives from former rebel states to seats in the national 
legislature. Taking control of the restoration process, Lincoln 
included in his program provisions and allowances which, he felt, 
would expedite the reunification of the United States.
One example of Lincoln's attitude of expediency can be 
seen in the way he phrased the oath that southerners would be 
required to take. Not wanting to dwell on the past, Lincoln 
required only that former rebels swear their loyalty to the 
Union "henceforth." Explaining the lenient oath requirement in 
a letter to Edwin M. Stanton, Lincoln wrote, "On principle 1 
dislike an oath which requires a man to swear he has not done 
wrong. It rejects the Christian principle of forgiveness on
terms of repentance. I think it is enough if the man does no
0wrong hereafter." Lincoln did, however, limit those who would 
be permitted to take the oath and re-enter the political realm. 
Excluding only officers or agents of the rebel government, those 
who left United States military, political or judicial positions 
to join the rebel cause, southern officers above the rank of 
Colonel in the army or lieutenant in the navy and those who had 
not treated blacks or whites in accordance with the rules of 
prisoners of war, the proclamation allowed the pardon of a great 
majority of former rebels Expressing hie reasons for enabling
13
the lower ranks of the Confederate army to re-enter the Union
easily and quickly, Lincoln later explained that "Wnat is true,
however, of him who heads the insurgent cause, is not necessarily
true of those who follow. Although he cannot reaccept the
10Union, they can." Reaffirming his faith in the inherent good­
ness of Southerners and his desire to restore the South as 
quickly as possible, Lincoln required only an oath of future 
loyalty.
In order for a state to begin full participation in the 
national government, at least ten percont of those qualified to 
vote in the 1860 Presidential election would have to take and 
abide by the loyalty oath. Desiring to bring rebel states back 
into Congress and other political positions as quickly as 
possible, Lincoln required what was later considered by many to 
be a ridiculously low percentage of loyal citizens. From 
Lincoln's point of view, the ten percent figure would be a 
realistic starting point from which, after a pro-Union government 
was established, former rebel states could induce large numbers 
of people to renounce their rebel ties. Lincoln explained this 
concept in his 1863 message, "By the proclamation a plan is 
presented which may be accepted as a rallying point, and which 
they are assured it: advance will not be rejected here. This may 
bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would."11 Providing 
the southerners with a realistic goal would, Lincoln felt, 
encourage them to begin the difficult process of reunification 
with the Union without delay.
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In his proclamation, Lincoln suggested that once at
least ten percent of a state's citizens took the loyalty oath, a
new republican government should be set up much as it had been
prior to the war. Explaining that "It will save labor and
12avoid great confusion," Lincoln once again expressed his desire 
for an uncomplicated and expedient transition into full political 
participation for the former rebel states. With this provision, 
Lincoln reaffirmed his view that the seceded states were still in 
the Union and that state lines, constitutions and laws would 
continue virtually unchanged.
The major exception to maintaining the pre-war political 
framework Lincoln required was that the reunited states must 
abide by laws passed during the war regarding slavery. The 
proclamation provided " . . .  that a full pardon is hereby granted
to them and each of them with restoration of all rights of
13property except as to slaves . . ." Although Lincoln desired 
expediency and wished to readmit former rebels with as little 
bitterness as possible, he was not willing to contradict the 
Emancipation Proclamation which he had first issued in September 
1862. Convinced of the importance of enforcing emancipation in 
the Southern states, Lincoln declared that, "To now abandon 
them [blacks] would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, 
but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith.
While committed to the idea of emancipation, Lincoln was curi­
ously vague about exactly how a state could go about freeing its 
slaves and what public services and rights were to be given to
15
the freed blacks. As will be discussed in more depth later, 
Lincoln was not adamant in forcing the restored states to 
abolish slavery; rather, he simply urged and encouraged it. When 
discussing the services which would be provided to the newly 
freed slaves, Lincoln was equally non-committal. In the procla­
mation, he wrote that any declaration of the permanent freedom 
for blacks and provisions for their education "will not be 
objected to by the national e x e c u t i v e . W h i l e  upholding his 
policy of emancipation, Lincoln was careful not to push 
southerners into reform too quickly. Perhaps fearing that former 
rebels would not realign themselves with the Union if changes 
came too fast, Lincoln was weak and indirect in his instructions 
regarding emancipation. It was most important, Lincoln felt, to 
establish a working loyal government— details and provisions for 
freed blacks could be worked out later.
In the conclusion of the Proclamation of Amnesty and 
Reconstruction, the President emphasized his willingness to be 
flexible in accepting other plans for reconstruction. "While 
the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest with 
his present impressions," he stated, "it must not be understood 
that no other possible mode would be a c c e p t a b l e . O p e n i n g  the 
door to possible modifications in the reconstruction process, 
Lincoln was not blindly committed to his own program but, rather 
desired to implement the most effective plan possible.
Because of the many conflicts in which Lincoln later 
became involved with the Radical faction of his party, it is
3 8
generally assumed that the Proclamation of Amnesty and Recon­
struction was considered a conservative document. Whiler no 
doubt, some concilliatory aspects of the plan fit the conserva­
tive mold, Herman Belz found that Lincoln*s restoration program 
leaned more toward the Radical position. The conservative 
aspect of the proclamation rests on Lincoln’s belief that the 
states were still in the Union and his willingness to use his 
pardoning power to accomplish restoration. In addition, the 
President's conviction that states should retain the same 
boundaries, laws and constitutions (except with respect to
slavery) agreed with tho conservative position which advocated
17as little change from the pre-war South as possible.
The Radical aspects of the proclamation, Belz discovered, 
were far more substantial. Lincoln's requirement that those 
seeking to proclaim their loyalty by taking the oath must swear 
to abide by all Union laws regarding slavery had a distinctly 
Radical tone. From the beginning of Congressional consideration 
of reconstruction, Radicals had agreed that the restoration cf 
political rights should be based on adherence to Union laws for­
bidding slavery. The requirement that the loyalty oath be taken 
by all southern citizens, not simply those involved in government 
or military work was also Radical. It implied that all citizens 
of the South, not only those directly involved in the rebellion, 
were guilty of past disloyalty to the Union. Going against the 
wishes of conservatives, Lincoln did not separate loyal from 
disloyal southern citizens, but, simply, grouped them together.
17
Lincoln’s provision that ten percent of the 1860 electorate had
to take the loyalty oath before a new state government could be
created, implied that the state governments had indeed been
destroyed and, therefore, needed to be rebuilt. Although
Lincoln advocated the maintenance of a pre-war framework, he
would not align himself fully with the conservatives and claim
that loyalist governments in the seceded states had continued to
18operate during the war.
Because Lincoln supported a more Radical than Conserva­
tive position with his proclamation, Republicans generally 
favored the plan while the Democrats denounced it. Temporarily 
satisfied that Lincoln's plan contained their main request, that 
restoration be contingent upon adherence to federal laws regard­
ing slavery, Radicals reacted positively toward the proclamation. 
Zn fact, on December 21, 1863, Radical Congressman James Ashley 
submitted a bill to Congress which contained many of the major 
provisions included in Lincoln's proclamation. The Ashley 
bill, as well as the chain of events leading to Radical dis­
illusionment with Lincoln's restoration program, will be dis­
cussed later. While Republicans were basically happy with the 
December proclamation, Democrats denounced it, claiming that a 
government based on ten percent loyalty would be ruled by a 
minority and, therefore, would violate republican principles of 
government. Charging that Lincoln had formulated many aspects 
of his plan in order to gain support from the Radical faction 
of his party, Democratic leaders charged that the Proclamation 
was a purely political move.
le
The press, m  the weeks following the reconstruction
proclamation was full of praise for Lincoln's plan. The New
York Times' Washington correspondent reported that, "No
President's message since George Washington returned into private
life has given such general satisfaction as that sent to Congress
19by Abraham Lincoln today." Tired of conflict and division, 
the public admired Lincoln's relatively lenient restoration plan 
and his desire for a quick return to a unified country.
What were the political implications of Lincoln's 
restoration plan? To some extent, Lincoln must have been con­
sidering the coming Presidential election in 1864 and the 
support he would need to win both nomination and election.
Richard Abbot has found that, "Although Lincoln was more con­
cerned with organizing loyal governments in the South that would 
abolish slavery than with building Republican parties there, the
men he helped install in power under his Reconstruction plan
20rallied to his political support." Although not his central 
objective, the Presidential support which was cultivated in the 
restored states could not help but benefit Lincoln politically. 
Lincoln's careful inclusion of both Radical and Conservative 
policies in his proclamation can also be viewed as political. 
Desiring the broadest base of support possible for his plan, 
Lincoln carefully included aspects of both programs in his plan, 
thereby avoiding specific requirements which would have offended 
either faction.
His proclamation issued, Lincoln could undertake formal 
restoration programs in Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana, where
19
an unofficial plan had been in operation for months. With 
military conditions favorable, political support intact and the 
public supporting him, Lincoln moved to implement his Proclama­
tion of Amnesty and Reconstruction.
20
CHAPTER III
IMPLEMENTATION OF LINCOLN'S PLAN
The actual implementation of the Presidential plan of 
reconstruction met with a number of difficulties and setbacks. 
Before the official proclamation was announced in December 1863, 
Lincoln had taken steps whenever possible to encourage the 
restoration of rebel states to the Union. Louisiana, Tennessee 
and Arkansas received special attention both before and after 
his December speech. Military governors had been appointed in 
each of these states prior to the amnesty proclamation and 
Lincoln stro ily encouraged holding elections as quickly as 
possible. Confident that the successful reconstruction of one 
southern state would bring others back into the Union more 
rapidly, Lincoln undertook the task of overseeing the progress 
of restoration in each of these states. Following a policy of 
minimal interference in order to promote expediency, Lincoln 
allowed his governors to direct operations as they saw fit and 
merely suggested and encouraged election dates and constitu­
tional conventions. Despite the President's support, the 
three states encountered a number of political and military 
difficulties which only served to delay the reconstruction 
process.
As the first state to begin reconstruction under the 
direction of President Lincoln in 1862, Louisiana was regarded
21
as the testing ground for Presidential reconstruction. Early
in the war, the southern portion of the state, particularly
the port of New Orleans, fell into Union hands. Having
avoided much of the military destruction present elsewhere
in the South and reflecting the pro-Unionist sentiment of the
New Orleans business community, Louisiana appeared to be in an
ideal position for restoration. Although he was quite flexible
in the actual implementation of his plan, President Lincoln,
early in the restoration process in Louisiana, insisted that
certain guidelines be followed. These guidelines would later
be applied to Tennessee and Arkansts as well. Declaring that
"carpetbaggiem" would not promote the true restoration of a
state, Lincoln wrote, "To send a parcel of Northern men . . .
would be disgusting and outrageous. Not only should officials
be natives of the restored state whenever possible, Lincoln
felt, but the elections held to vote them into office should
also not be forced militarily. Rather, they should be truly
desired by the public. Beyond these two principles, Lincoln
tried to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of the
state. In a letter to Louisiana military governor, Nathaniel P.
Banks, Lincoln stated that "While I very well know what I would
be glad for Louisiana to do, it is quite a different thing to
2assume direction of the matter.” With Louisiana's restoration, 
the President established a procedure which he would later 
insist upon in Tennessee and Arkansas.
As the first step in the restoration of Louisiana, 
Lincoln appointed a staunchly anti-slavery man, George P.
22
Shepley, to be military governor in June 1862. Shepley's ally, 
General Benjamin F. Butler, was commander of the Union forces 
which had occupied southern Louisiana. Called "Beast Butler" 
because of his declaration that all southern women walking the 
streets at night were to be arrested as prostitutes, Butler 
promoted feelings of animosity toward the Union. Constantly 
antagonizing and alienating the citizens of the state, General 
Butler did nothing to promote reconstruction. Realizing that 
Butler was undermining the reconstruction cause, Lincoln 
uncharacteristically intervened and sent the General to serve 
elsewhere. General Nathaniel P. Banks was soon chosen to 
replace Butler.
Meanwhile, two factions in Louisiana v»ere struggling to 
gain control of the process to return Louisiana to a loyal 
Unionist state. These factions each formed a committee which 
would represent their views in political circles. One, the 
Executive Central Committee, consisted of conservative, pro­
slavery planters. This group advocated restoring the old 
state constitution which protected slavery. They felt that 
the Emancipation Proclamation was only a war measure and that 
slavery would probably be restored after the war. in con­
trast, their rivals who formed the Free State General Committee 
were strongly anti-slavery and wanted to develop a new state 
constitution which expressly prohibited slavery. Governor 
Shepley, because of his Radical beliefs, was sympathetic to 
the free state cause and assigned his Attorney General,
23
Thomas J. Durant, the task of collecting a registry of loyal 
citizens with the object of soon holding a constitutional con­
vention. Encouraged by the prospect of a new anti-slavery 
constitution and, eventually, elections which would complete 
the restoration process, Lincoln, in June 1863, endorsed the 
work of the Free State Committee. Replying to a request from 
the Executive State Committee for support, Lincoln declared 
his loyalty to the Free State Committee by stating that he 
would not endorse the present Louisiana constitution.^
During the Shepley administration, while work towards 
a constitutional convention was just beginning, another 
encouraging development occurred. In December 1862, an election 
had been held in the state to choose two members for United 
States Congress. Benjamin Flanders, originally of New 
Hampshire, and Michael Hahn, a long time Louisiana citizen, 
were the Representatives chosen. Both were members of the 
Free State Committee and were staunch anti-slavery men. To 
the surprise of many, the Congressional Committee on Elections 
reported in favor of seating Hahn and Flanders because more 
than half of those who had voted in the 1859 elections had 
participated. The results, therefore, were considered 
legitimate. All state election laws, the conmittee felt, had 
been followed with the exception that Shepley was a military 
rather than regularly elected governor. Members of the House 
opposed to the seating claimed that Lincoln had controlled the 
Congressional elections through military force and that a
24
military governor, authorized only to preserve the peace, had 
no power to call for elections. The committee's recommendation, 
however, had a great deal of influence and to the delight of 
Louisiana citizens, Hahn and Flanders were admitted to Congrers 
by a vote of 92 to 44 or February 17, 1863. The admission of 
the Louisiana Representatives was a great victory for the 
Lincoln administration in that it endorsed the steps the 
President had taken toward restoration in the state. Perhaps 
it was the successful admission of the Louisiana Representatives 
into Congress that gave Lincoln the confidence to announce his 
plan in December 1863. Seeing the Congressional endorsement 
of the Louisiana plan, Lincoln optimistically assumed that a 
new anti-slavery constitution would follow in the state, as 
well as in states such as Tennessee and Arkansas whsre restora-
etion attempts were just beginning.
When Nathaniel Banks replaced General Butler in early 
1863, conflicts immediately arose between Banks and Shepley. 
Shepley was a Radical who wanted the Free State corranittee to 
control the politics of the state, thwarting the historical 
power of the planters, and to create a new state constitution 
quickly. Banks, however, wished to make conciliatory gestures 
toward the enemies of the Shepley government in order to broaden 
the Unionist base of support. He > id not want to alienate the 
conservatives in the state a h^sty movement toward a new 
constitution. The lack of agreement between the two Louisiana 
leaders as well as an absence of popular support for a
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constitutional convention caused a delay in the registration of 
loyal citizens. Lincoln, who had been so pleased with the 
Congressional developments in February and was about to announce 
his official restoration plan, wrote to Banks in November 1863 
that the failure to continue working toward a convention "dis­
appoints me bitterly."® Realizing that political disputes 
within the state could destroy what little had already been 
done towards reconstruction, Lincoln decided in December 1863 
to proclaim Banks as the supreme authority in Louisiana. "I 
have all the while intended you to be mastsr," Lincoln wrote 
Banks. "Governor Shepley was appointed to assist the Commander 
of the Department ard not to thwart him, or act independently
7of him." The balance of power established, General Banks 
effectively took over th* /astorati on movement in Louisiana.
Having gained politicai control, Banks completely 
rejected the Free State committee plan of holding a constitu­
tional convention and then elect ng state officials under a 
new anti-slavery constitution. Banks simply -ailed an election 
for seven stall* executive officer* to be hold on February 22, 
1864, before a new constitution aould be drawn up. Planning 
to issue military decrees uuii.fying the pro-slavery sections 
of the existing state oonst itulion, Banks felt that a new 
document was not needed in order to hold a legitimate election. 
Explaining to Lincoln that an immediate election was "the only 
speedy and certain method of accomplishing your object,"”
General Banks declared that putting the slavery question to a
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vote would be a risk and that simply negating slavery through
9military decrees was a safer course*
Banks promised that a constitutional convention would 
be formed soon after the elections* Lincoln, although he 
would have preferred an explicitly anti-slavery state consti­
tution, reacted positively toward Banks* plan, "Your confidence 
in the practibility of constructing a free state government, 
speedily for Louisiana,” Lincoln wrote to Banks, ’and your zeal 
to accomplish it, are very gratifying,"10 Desiring the expedient 
restoration of Louisiana, Lincoln was willing to allow a new 
constitution to be formed later. Members of the tree State 
Committee, however, were furious that the control of restoration 
had been taken from them. Free State Committee leader T. j. 
Durant protested to Lincoln that the committee was "deeply 
mortified” when the President ”took the whole question of 
civil reorganization out of our hands and gave it to the 
exclusive control of the military.1,11 Protest over Lincoln's 
acceptance of the Louisiana elections without a new constitu­
tion soon developed in Congress. Radicals such as Henry 
Winter Davis of Maryland and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania 
inflamed the Louisiana election question into a major political 
issue. The consequences will be discussed later.
Michael Hahn, one of the Representatives who had been 
admitted to Congress in early 1863, was elected governor as a 
result of the controversial elections. He and Banks saw to it 
that an election for convention delegates was held, as premised,
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on March 28, 1864. The convention met from April to July and,
in its new constitution, abolished slavery and established some
provision for the suffrage of blacks. On September 5, an
election for two r.ew Louisiana congressmen was held. The
restoration of Louisiana was thus complete for the state had
fulfilled all of the provisions established in Lincoln's Amnesty
and Reconstruction Proclamation. One major problem still
existed. Congress refused to seat the newly elected Congressmen
so Louisiana could not be represented on the national level.
This lack of representation meant that the state could not be
12considered entirely restored to its pre-war status.
The story of Tennessee's reconstruction is one filled
with military setbacks which slowed the process considerably.
When Abraham Lincoln appointed Andrew Johnson to the post of
military Governor on March 3, 1862, he had reason for optimism
about the possibilities of restoring Tennessee. General
Ulysses S. Grant pushed the rebel army across the Tennessee
River and freed the western portion of the state of Confederate
control. Johnson was instructed 'to reestablish the authority
of the Federal government" in the state and to "provide the
means of maintaining peace and security in the loyal inhabitants
of the state until they shall be able to establish a civil 
13government.” While these instructions were vague, Lincoln 
later offered a more concrete piece of advice, "Get emancipation 
into your new State government Constitution and there will be 
no such word aa fail in your case. Johnson was fully
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committed to this objective because, although he was a Democrat,
he was strongly anti-slavery and had opposed the secession of
1 5Tennessee vehemently.
Once again, as in Louisiana, Lincoln left the actual 
implementation of the plan to the officials in the state. "You, 
and the cooperating friends there," Lincoln informed Johnson, 
"can better judge of the ways and means, than can be judged by 
any hore."^ Armed with vague instructions and a deep con­
viction to rid his state of slavery, Andrew Johnson set out to 
restore his state to the Union.
Johnson's unwavering opposition to the evils of slavery 
and his refusal to leave his United States Senate seat when 
Tennessee seceded all served to make him extremely unpopular 
among Democrats. This unpopularity was to be expected. His 
difficulties with the Unionists in the state, however, proved 
to make Johnson's task of restoration quite difficult. A long 
time adversary of William G. Brownlow, the leader of the 
Tennessee Unionist party, Johnson began his campaign to gather 
loyal unionists at a disadvantage. To aggravate the situation 
further, Johnson adopted policies with which many unionists, 
including Brownlow, disagreed. Johnson decided that, in order 
to eliminate the secessionist influence in the state, he would 
remove or silence anti-Union leaders. In an extremely unpopular 
move, Johnson ordered seven prominent Nashville leaders (six of 
whom were ministers) who had refused to take a loyalty oath to 
be exiled in rebel-held territory. Johnson also ordered a
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number of Nashville newspapers such as the Daily Times and The
Banner to submit to censorship in April 1862, only a month after
he had been appointed. The Gazette and The Patriot, secessionist
papers, were forced to stop publication entirely. All of
these harsh measures contributed to deteriorate Johnson's already
weak banc of support. Johnson, in time, became so unpopular
that he constantly received threatening letters and plots to
1 7assassinate him were numerous.
While Johnson's lack of political support in Tennessee 
slowed restoration, the fluctuating military situation in the 
state was also detrimental to the process. Lincoln's optimism 
when he appointed Johnson was short lived for less than a 
month later, the Confederates once again entered middle 
Tennessee. The announcement of Lincoln's Preliminary Emancipa­
tion Proclamation, on September 22, 1862, however, inspired 
reconstruction activity in the state despite the uncertain 
military situation. Promising a less harsh slavery policy for 
those states which complied, the proclamation made citizens in 
the state eager to demonstrate their loyalist feelings. Mass 
meetings, encouraged by Governor Johnson, were held around the 
state to stimulate Union support. Johnson decided that enough 
support had bean indicated by Tennessee citisens in these 
rallies to hold an election for two members of Congress on 
December 29, 1862. These elections, however, were a complete 
disaster. Confederate General Nathan B. Forrest invaded the 
voting district on election day and the polling place site
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became a battleground. Obviously, a sufficient voter turnout
18was not possible and no one was elected.
After almost a year of little reconstruction progress, 
prospects once again looked good in September 1863 when Con­
federate forces evacuated Chattanooga. President Lincoln con­
sidered this an ideal opportunity to move ahead with 
reconstruction and informed Johnson that, "You need not be 
reminded that it [the Chattanooga victory] is in the nick of
time for re-inaugurating a loyal state government. Not a moment
18should be lost." Giving Johnson the authority to exercise all 
powers necessary for restoring the state, Lincoln encouraged him 
once again to hold mass meetings and to attempt another election.
Following the Battle of Chattanooga in November 1863, 
Tennessee was cleared of Rebel soldiers. With President Lincoln's 
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction providing explicit 
guidelines, Johnson called for a Congressional election to be 
held March 5, 1864. The election could not be considered valid, 
however, because confusion, disorganisation and lack of public 
interest resulted in a voter turnout lower than Lincoln's 
required ten percent of the 1860 registered voters. His 
unpopularity still strong in the state, Johnson was unable to 
rally voters to support the restoration cause.1,9
Later in 1864, the East Tennesses Union Executive Com­
mittee, consisting of Brownlow and his followers, called for a 
constitutional convention to be held on January 9, 1865. The 
convention adopted an amendment to the old state constitution
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which abolished slavery and called for an election for governor
and the General Assembly to be held February 22. When more than
ten percent of the 1860 electorate took the loyalty oath and
participated in the election, the amendments were ratified by a
25,293 to 48 margin. William G. Brownlow was elected Governor.
Once again, a southern state had completed the provisions
established in Abraham Lincoln's reconstruction plan. The
acceptance of Tennessee Representatives into Congress, however,
was not achieved so Tennessee, like Louisiana, was left in a
20precarious political situation.
Once it began in earnest in 1863, the restoration of 
Arkansas progressed with far fewer difficulties than were 
encountered in either Louisiana or Tennessee. Military and 
political problems did not hinder the reconstruction process 
and a great public demand for a restored state government helped 
to speed the progress of restoration. Reluctant at first to 
secede, Arkansas had not withdrawn from the Union until after 
the fall of Fort Sumter. Many citizens in the state retained 
their unionist loyalties throughout the war. Initial efforts, 
however, to appoint a military governor and move toward tlu 
development of a loyal state government were not entirely suc­
cessful. After an early summer campaign in which the Union had 
captured Helena, Lincoln seised the opportunity to appoint a 
military governor in Arkansas. Hoping that the Union holdings 
would soon be expanded and solidified, Lincoln appointed General 
John 8. Phelps of Missouri to oversee the military in the state
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and what he hoped would be a movement toward reconstruction. 
Lincoln's expectations, however, were not met. Uncertain Union 
military security and a long illness which befell General Phelps 
both contributed to a lack of pro-Union activity in the state. 
Within a year, Lincoln,disillusioned by the lack of movement, 
revoked Phelps' military commission. The President decided
that Arkansas was not ready to be restored and, therefore, did
21not yet require a military governor.
During 1863, however, a number of Union military vic­
tories made Lincoln anxious to attempt restoration again. By 
July, all territory north and east of the Arkansas River had 
been cleared of Confederate troops. This significant Union 
bulwark was expanded when General Frederick Steele successfully 
led union troops in the Helena-Little Rock expedition. On 
September 10 1863, Little Rock fell into Union hands and more
than half of Arkansas was under Federal control. Lincoln 
decided to appoint General Steele to the military governorship 
soon after his brilliant Little Rock campaign. Lincoln wrote 
to Steele that he was to be "master" of the reorganization 
process. Perhaps attempting to avoid political power struggles
which had developed earlier in Louisiana, Lincoln made it clear
22that Steele alone was in charge of Arkansas' restoration.
The Military Governor's task of gathering loyal union­
ists was made easy because for months the public iad been rally­
ing to the unionist cause. Self-appointed leaders B. w. Gantt 
and William Fishbaok, both ex-Confederates, enthusiastically
*
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organized a number of mass meetings throughout the Union terri­
tory in the state. These meetings were not only popular but 
were also endorsed by Steele. The National Democrat , a popular 
Arkansas paper, reported th ; one such meeting held on December 31,
1863, in Little Rock was attended by more than 3,000 people, an
impressive showing considering the number of citizens who were
23away fighting in the war. Thomas S. Staples, an Arkansas
reconstruction historian, found that, "a majority of the local
24mass meetings had resolved for immediate emancipation.H With 
Union and emancipation sentiment strong in the state, Gantt, 
Fishback and their followers became the chief instigators in the 
call for a constitutional convention to be held in January, a 
move that greatly pleased both Lincoln and Steele. On January 5,
1864, Lincoln officially offered Arkansas residents the oppor­
tunity to take the loyalty oath and thus to begin the process of
2rreorganizing the state government. ~
The convention met in early January 1864. After disputes 
over the admission of some delegates were settled and convention 
rules were established, the delegates began revising the old 
state constitution. The new document forbade slavery but did 
not go so far as to provide suffrage for the freed men. The 
convention also established a provisional government consisting 
of a governor, lieutenant governor and secretary of state which 
would remain in power until regular elections could be held.
Isaac Murphy, an unwavering unionist who had denounced secession 
ttecoflKrtxt the early 1160s, was chosen provisional governor.
The vote to ratify the new constitution and elect permanent 
state officers was scheduled for March 13, 1864. Steele, once 
again supporting Gantt, Fishback and their constituents, gave 
the new constitution and proposed election his endorsement.
In late Febn try Steele addressed the people and encouraged
them to support the new Constitution which was "based upon the
2 6principles of freedom." The President, also, was pleased
27with the adherence to his call for a free state constitution.
in the weeks leading up to election day, Harris Flanigan, 
Governor of the Confederate *> ate government in Arkansas, 
realized the threat the election posed to the continuance of 
rebel influence in Arkansas. Attempting to discourage voters 
from going to the polls, Flanigan instructed Confederate sympa­
thizers and soldiers in the area to do everything possible to 
interfere with the election process, including the use of 
violent threats and guerilla tactics Despite this alarming 
activity, however, Union support ran strong and a higher number 
than expected arrived at the polls to vote. "Tht people have 
been enthusiastic," provisional governor Murphy telegraphed 
Lincoln, and were, "voting in inssenee risk of loss of life and 
property, the guerillas having threatened to hang everyone, 
that went to the polls. * According to Lincoln s ten percent 
provision, 5,400 votes were needed in order to validate the 
election. Far surpassing the requirement, 12,177 out of 12,403 
total voter# chose to ratify the new constitution and sleet 
Issac Murphy as permanent governor. While seam claims of voting
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irregularities arose from the >rs of The National Democrat
anc* The Washington Telegraph, the results were accepted as 
legitimate in view of the impressive voter turnout. Lincoln 
further confirmed the validity of the results in a letter to 
the newly-elected governor, "I am much gratified to learn that 
you got out such a large vote, so nearly all the right way, at
2 < jthe la’e election.” Generally satisfied with the methods 
used to conduct the erection, Lincoln was impressed by the 
efficiency and expediency with which General Steele and the 
citizens of Arkansas had restored their government.^
When the new government was inaugurated on April 18, 
1864, in Little Rock, one major stumbling block remained— that 
of the Congressional acceptance of Arkansas Senators and Repre­
sentatives. The new legislature chose William Fishback, an 
ex-confederate and important leader in rallying unionist support 
in the state, and Elisha Baxter, a respected man who, like 
Murphy, had an unblemished record of Union loyalty, to the 
Senate. Congress, however, refused to even review the creden­
tials of the Arkansas delegation so, as in Louisiana and 
Tennessee, Congressional representation was denied a state 
which had fulfilled all of the requirements for restoration 
specified in Lincoln's plan. The President was bitterly dis­
appointed that the Arkansas restoration program which had 
progressed so satisfactorily should end in such a manner. He 
refused, however, to abandon the loyal government in the state 
and instructed Steele in June 1964 to, "give that government
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and the people there, the same support and protection that you
31would if the members had been admitted [to Congress].M
Although Arkansas1 reconstruction ended in Congressional 
disappointment, the progress towards reconstruction in the 
state was more efficiently conducted than in Louisiana or 
Tennessee. In most respects, the Arkansas restoration was a 
model example of how Lincoln's plan would work. A military 
governor was appointed, unionist sentiment gathered, oaths 
taken and a new, free state constitution was ratified prior to 
the establishment of a permanent loyal state government. Not 
plagued by the military setbacks experienced by Tennessee or 
the political conflicts present in both Louisiana and Tennessee, 
Arkansas and her citizens were able to carry out the President's 
plan without delay or conflict.
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CHAPTER IV
CONGRESSIONAL REACTION, PART I
Amidst the complications of implementing his plan in 
Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee, Lincoln had to face another 
source of frustration— Congressional opposition. While original 
reaction to his proclamation had been positive and a Congressional 
bill modeled after his plan was introduced into the House in late 
December 1863, relations between Congress and Lincoln deteriorated 
quickly. Various political motivations and expressions of dis­
approval of the President's actions in Louisiana led many former 
pro-administration Congressmen to change their allegiances. 
Conditions became perfect for Radical sentiment to dominate 
Congressional actions.
As discussed earlier, public and press reaction to 
Lincoln's proclamation was quite positive. Politically, the 
proclamation was well received by members of Lincoln's party 
while Democrats denounced the plan as a political move which 
did not promote a republican form of government. The sur­
prisingly broad support of the Republican party greatly enhanced 
the plan's chances for success and for a short time newspapers 
and Congressmen themselves expressed optimism for the future of 
Lincoln's plan. "The President seems to have made friends among 
the Radicals and Conservatives with his new plan of Reconstruc­
tion," the editor of the Springfield, Massachusetts Weekly
38
Republican wrote, "Henceforth the Republican party is a unit,
and no quarrels between Radicals and Conservatives will be in
order.Reflecting a similar opinion, John Forney, secretary
of the Senate and publisher of the Philadelphia Press remarked
in his paper that he had never witnessed "a more cordial and
2enthusiastic unity in any party."
The key co this new unity among Republicans was that 
even those members of the party that had in the past opposed 
many of Lincoln's policies were satisfied with the December 
proclamation. Because it required each citizen to pledge to 
uphold laws made regarding slavery and it strongly suggested 
that new anti-slavery constitutions be created before elections 
were held, the proclamation was well received by many members 
of Congress who were staunch anti-slavery advocates. John Hay, 
Lincoln's secretary, wrote that even such Radicals as Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts and Owen Lovejoy of Illinois were happy 
with the President's plan. Massachusetts radical, George 
Boutwell, Hay wrote, described the proclamation, "It is a very 
able and shrewd paper. It has great points of popularity and
3it is right." Another Radical, James Ashley of Ohio, was so 
convinced of the correctness of thePresidential plan that he 
introduced a bill to implement most of its main provisions.
Ashley who had earlier been a leading advocate of the 
terri totalization of rebel states as a reconstruction measure, 
had modified his opinion by December 1863. Now considering the 
rebellious states to have retained an existence within the Union,
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Ashley felt that many of Lincoln's restoration provisions were 
wise. His support was indicative of a changing attitude in 
Congress which seemed to be moving toward a more moderate and 
conciliatory view of the South and its reconstruction. Although 
many reconstruction bills were introduced into the two houses 
of Congress following the President's proclamation, Ashley's 
was considered the most important because of the Congressman's 
prestige and drastic shift in opinion which the bill repre­
sented.
In introducing his bill to the House on December 21,
1863, Ashley argued that it was Congress' duty to guarantee a 
republican form of government to each state. In the preamble 
of his bill he explained that, "it is obligatory upon Congress 
after the rebellious States have been reduced to obedience and 
the citizens thereof are willing to establish state governments 
under the Constitution, to provide oy law for eliciting the
4will of the loyal people of said states.” Having established 
Congressional authority to direct the reconstruction of the 
rebel states, Ashley provided specific instructions for them to 
follow. Whenever a district in any rebel state came under the 
control of the Union, a military governor would be appointed 
for that state. Reconstruction would begin in earnest when 
the people in the ntate "signified to the Governor a desire to 
return to <cheir obedience to the Constitution.”5 While Lincoln's 
proclamation did not explicitly call for the appointment of a 
military governor, Lincoln obviously agreed with Ashley's
prevision for he had, previous to his proclamation, made such 
appointments in the three states in which his reconstruction 
program was implemented.
When public desire to form a loyal state government was 
made known, the enrollment of loyal male citizens over the age 
of twenty-one would begin; when the number enrolled reached a 
figure greater than ten percent of those eligible to vote in the 
I860 election of the state, a constitutional convention could 
be called by the military governor. Once again, Ashley's bill 
directly reflected a major Presidential policy by adopting the 
ten percent provision. Reflecting a conciliatory attitude toward 
the South and a desire to end the division of the country quickly 
Ashley's bill required the same oath provided in Lincoln's pro­
clamation.
Rather than merely encouraging the development of a new 
anti-slavery constitution as Lincoln's plan had, Ashley's bill 
expressly required it. The bill provided that the new state 
constitution should be "Republican and not repugnant to the 
Constitution of the United States and the President's proclama­
tion of January 1, 1863 [the Emancipation Proclamation]."® More 
explicit in its instructions than Lincoln's proclamation, the 
bill stated that the freedom of blacks must be guaranteed and 
protected in the new document, if the Constitution met these 
requirements and was ratified by the loyal registered voters of 
the state, the President would declare the new government to be 
loyal and returned to the Union. Senators and Congressmen would
then be elected under the new constitution, to be ’entitled to 
appear” in Congress, If the constitution did not fulfill the 
requirements specified in the Ashley bill, the state would 
remain under military governorship until a proper constitution 
was ratified.
While the Ashley bill reflected many of the provisions
present in Lincoln’s plan, such as the specific steps towards
restoration and the requirement of a new constitution, a few
significant differences existed which indicate that Ashley’s
Radical ideals had not been entirely modified. These differences
were mainly in the rules for elections in the states undergoing
reconstruction. While Lincoln, in the interest of expediency,
had declared that elections could be held under existing state
election laws, Ashley provided simply that all males over
twenty-one who qualified as loyal could vote. The difference
was that every former rebel state, if it kept its old election
laws, would prohibit blacks from voting. Ashley's general
requirement of males over twenty-one would, naturally, include
blacks. A further difference in the voting provisions was that
the Ashley bill eliminated many more former rebels from taking
the loyalty oath than did the Presidential plan. Lincoln, when
considering the military, had excluded only officers above the
rank of Colonel in the Army or Lieutenant in the Navy. Ashley,
in contrast, excluded "all persons who have voluntarily borne
arms against the United States, or held any office Civil or 
7Military•" Ashley's bill, therefore, significantly reduced the
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number of citizens who could take the loyalty oath, thus making 
it more difficult to reach the ten percent figure. The recon­
struction process would, inevitably, be slowed. The true 
effects of the Ashley bill, however, will never be known.
Although the bill schemed to be gathering support from a unified 
pro-administration feeling in the Republican party, the attitude
oof Congress soon changed. The bill was never passed.
As early as January 1864, rumblings of discontent within 
the Republican party were apparent. Whitelaw Reid, editor of 
the Cincinnati Gazette, reported that while the first reaction 
to Lincoln's proclamation ’-ad been positive, "as they [Congress­
men] began to scan it more closely the radical wing of the
gadministration party became more cautious in their praise." 
Radicals occasionally complained that the proclamation did not 
go far enough to guarantee the rights of blacks and that it was 
too lenient towards former Rebels. One point of dissatisfac­
tion was the absence of a time limit on the offer of amnesty.
Maine Republican William Pitt Fessenden expressed his disapproval 
in a letter to his wife, "Think of telling the Rebels they may 
fight as long as they can, and take a pardon when they have had 
enough of it."^ Those complaints, however, did not represent 
an organized movement against Lincoln and were expressed only 
in isolated incidents. It was not until Lincoln proceeded with 
Louisiana's reconstruction in a manner with which many Republicans 
disagreed that a genuine anti-administration movement arose.
As discussed earlier, when the President recognized 
political conflicts in Louisiana between Military Governor Shepley
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and General Nathaniel Banks in December 1863, he declared Banks 
to be "master" of the restoration process in the state. Banks 
decided that it would be wise first to hold an election for 
loyal state officers and then form a constitutional convention.
Not wanting to risk having an anti-slavery constitution voted 
down by the people, Banks would simply hold elections under the 
old constitution with all slavery provisions in it made null and 
void by military decree. Although Lincoln undoubtably would 
have preferred to have the new constitution ratified before 
elections took place, he consented to Bank's plan in the interest 
of expediency. Concerned with setting up a loyal state govern­
ment as quick)y as possible, Lincoln was willing to be flexible 
in the order of steps towards a restored government.
As promised by Banks, a constitutional convention was 
held '.n late March, one month after the elections, and the docu­
ment was ratified in September 1864. Radicals in Congress, 
however, were not willing to be as flexible as the President.
In January, when Lincoln approved Banks' intention to hold an 
election before a new state constitution was developed, members 
of Congress reacted with anger. Maryland Congressman Henry 
Winter Davis expressed the opinion of many Radicals, "There is 
no loyal authority to hold any election in the State of Louisiana; 
any attempt to hold an election by any body of persons is a 
usurpation of sovereign authority against the United States."** 
The main reason Radicals had originally accepted the Presidential 
plan was their belief that, following Lincoln's urging, states
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would adopt an anti-slavery constitution before taking any other 
actions toward reconstruction. Feeling betrayed by Lincoln's 
actions in Louisiana, Radicals began to criticize almost every 
aspect of his plan, soon deciding to develop a reconstruction 
program of their own.
In order to condemn the developments in Louisiana and to
avoid such actions in the future, an influential congressman from
Pennsylvania, Thaddeus Stevens, proposed a bill in January 1864.
The preamble of the bill declared that "No portion of said
territory shall be readmitted into the Union as a State, or be
represented in its Congress . . . until the people within the
territory forming such State, shall, by its organic law, forever
12prohibit slavery." Referring to Rebel states as territories, 
Stevens revealed that the radical opinion was once again moving 
toward territorialization and harsh reconstruction requirements.
As criticism toward the Presidential plan and, therefore, 
Ashley's bill mounted, protests over the ten percent requirement 
began to surface. Ohio Senator Benjamin F. Wade, who chaired 
the Senate Committee on Reconstruction, declared that the pro­
vision violated "American principles” and that "until majorities 
can be found loyal and trustworthy for state government, they 
must be governed by a stronger h a n d . P r o t e s t i n g  that only 
ten percent of the voting population did not represent a demo­
cratic majority, radicals found yet another flaw in Lincoln's 
plan.
The content of the plan itself was not the only source 
of dissatisfaction. Many felt that Congress alone had the
4 5
jurisdiction to decide if a state had been legitimately restored 
and that, consequently, Congress should set up the requirements 
which would have to be met. Basing their reconstruction powers 
on the section of the constitution that Ashley used in the pre­
amble of his bill, stating that Congress had the duty to guarantee 
a republican form of government to every state, many Radicals 
felt the President must follow a restoration plan developed by 
Congress. Rather than using this constitutional provision as a 
reason to work with the President as Ashley had, the Radicals
now thought it justification to exclude the President entirely
14from the restoration process.
A3 dissatisfaction with Lincoln's restoration program 
surged through Congreus, Radicals decided to take advantage of 
the anti-administration sentiment. The specific points of 
Lincoln's program and a desire for Congressional control over 
reconstruction were not the only issues involved in the desire 
of Radicals to discredit the President. Many had decided that 
Lincoln should not have another term as President, preferring 
Salmon P. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, for the office. 
With the election coming up in November, Radicals began in late 
January to emphasize the many f^aws in the President's restora­
tion policies, thereby reducing, they hoped, his chances of 
receiving the Republican nomination in July.
One Radical, Henry Winter Davis, had not only political 
but personal differences with Lincoln. Herman Belz had dis­
covered that in January 1864 Lincoln refused Davis' request for
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he.lp in a Maryland Congressional election that pitted Davis 
against Montgomery Blair. Although Davis kept his seat after a 
tough election battle, he held a continuing grudge against 
Lincoln. It was shortly after the Maryland election that Davis 
began to denounce Lincoln's actions in Louisiana. As sentiment 
against Lincoln and his actions grew, Davis realized that the 
perfect opportunity to reduce Lincoln's power over reconstruc­
tion had presented itself. On February 15, 1864, Davis intro­
duced a reconstruction bill which, while similar in a few 
aspects to Lincoln's plan, was a direct challenge to many of the
basic principles the President had offered in the Proclamation
15of Amnesty and Reconstruction.
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CHAPTER V
CONGRESSIONAL REACTION, PART II
In early 1864, Abraham Lincoln’s political prospects 
appeared grim. His actions in Louisiana had drawn criticism 
from many Republicans and the Presidential election was not far 
off. While his political base appeared to be lowly crumbling, 
the President's public support also waned. The war seemed to be 
at a stalemate? there had been no significant Union victories to 
bolster the public's spirit since the year before. Amidst these 
discouraging developments, Lincoln had to face another signifi­
cant challenge--the Wade-Davis bill. The bill was Congress' 
response to Lincoln's reconstruction plan and the first stage in 
what would prove to be a long and bitter confrontation between 
the executive and the Congress.
Henry Winter Davis, chairman of the newly formed House 
Select Committee on the Rebellious States, was prepared to 
introduce a reconstruction bill as early as the end of January 
1864 but he was unable to get authorisation to print and intro­
duce the bill until February 15. While the bill had more radical 
intentions than that earlier introduced by James Ashley, many of 
the same arguments were used by Davis to establish Congressional 
power over the restoration process. Like Ashley, Davis relied on 
the fourth section of Article IV of the Constitution which 
charged Congress with the duty to ensure a republican form of
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government in each state. Unlike Ashley, however, Davis used 
the clause to expand the powers of Congress in the area of 
reconstruction. Where Ashley had argued that both Congress and 
the President should play a joint role in reconstruction process, 
Davis interpreted the clause as excluding the President entirely 
from the process. In his speech to the House of Representatives 
supporting the bill, Davis explained that a precedent giving 
Congress the exclusive power to determine the status of a state 
government had already been set. Referring to an 1849 Rhode 
Island case, Luther vs. Borden, Davis claimed that Chief Justi •:? 
Taney in hiB decision had established that "it is the exclusiv 
perogative of Congress, and not of the President— to determine 
what is and what is not the established government of the 
state . . Extending the Supreme Court decision to the
current reconstruction question, Davis and his committee set out 
to establish Congressional guidelines for the restoration of a 
state which excluded policies President Lincoln had already 
established.
The procedure a state would be required to follow in 
order to be declared a republican and loyal government was 
similar in some ways to Ashley's bill. The most important 
similarity was that Davis' bill required a former rebel state 
to draft a new anti-slavery constitution before elections or 
other activities of a normal government would begin. Following 
the Radical position that reconstruction should be contingent 
upon the emancipation of slaves, Davis' bill expressly required
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the new state constitution to guarantee freedom for blacks in
2order for it to be considered valid by Congress.
The anti-slavery constitution would be developed and 
voted on under the direction of a provisional governor. Unlike 
Lincoln and Ashley's plans, however, this governor did not 
necessarily have to be a part of the military. The appointed 
governor would not begin steps toward restoring the state until 
all armed resistance to Union forces in the state was completely 
eliminated. This provision could easily mean that reconstruction 
in many states would not begin until the war was over. As will 
become clear, Davis and many other Radicals thought this delay 
wise. Davis declared that there should be an intermediate 
period "in which sound legislative wisdom requires that the 
authority of Congress should take possession of . . . those 
states now in rebellion until peace can be restored and republi­
can government can be established deliberately, undisturbed by
3the . . . fear of arms." Only after all armed resistence was 
"trampled into the dust" could a provisional governor begin to 
direct the registration of loyal citizens with the aim of elect­
ing delegates to a constitutional convention.
To be eligible to enroll as a loyal citizen, Davis' bill 
declared, men would be required to take a loyalty oath. This 
oath, however, was drastically different from that provided in 
Lincoln's December 1863 amnesty proclamation. Mot only requiring 
future loyalty to the Union, the cath required past loyalty as 
well. First instigated in 1862 as the oath required for all who
50
wished to hold federal office# this "iron-clad” oath forced the
taker to swear he had never borne arms against the United States
4nor aided the rebellion. Obviously, a majority of citizens in
any former rebel state would have participated in the rebellion
in some aspect and, therefore, would be unable to take the oath.
The purpose of the "iron-clad" oath was to gain time for the
Radicals to rolidify their control over reconstruction before
the proces. / ib implemented throughout the South. Knowing the
requirement of past loyalty would greatly alow progress toward
establishing a loyal government in any southern state, the
Radicals wanted to delay reconstruction until after the war.
Those eligible to take the oath, the bill provided,
would be "all white male citizens of the United States resident
5in the state in their respective counties." It is surprising 
that Davis included the racial qualification in his bill.
Radicals at the time were not only staunchly anti-slavery but 
also generally advocated black suffrage. This qualification, 
however, does not seem to have promoted controversy because no 
mention of this section of the bill was made during the lengthy 
discussions in either the House or the Senate.
Once a sufficient number of loyal males were registered, 
the provisional governor could order a constitutional convention 
to be elected. At this convention three basic provisions must 
be written into the new constitution: that slavery be expressly
prohibited; that the confederate debt be formally repudiated; and 
that those who had held civil or military positions in either the
rebellious state or the Confederacy be prohibited from running 
for the legislature or the governorship. Once these three pro­
visions were met, the Constitution would be put to the voters 
for ratification. If the voters approved the new document, the 
President could, after the approval of Congress, declare the 
state to be loyal. Ensuring Congressional control, Davis made 
it a point to give the national legislature the final decision 
on whether a state had taken sufficient steps toward restora- 
tion.6
On the day the bill was to be brought up for a vote in 
the House, May 4, 1864, Davie reported two amendments from his 
committee. In the original version of the ^±11 which had been 
printed and formally introduced on February 15, only 10% of the 
1860 electorate, the figure Lincoln had adopted, were required 
to take the loyalty oath. If this provision had remained in 
the final version of the bill, early restoration, despite the 
iron-clad oath, could have been possible. The amendment, however, 
drastically raised the requirement from ten percent to a majority.
7Arguing that "One tenth cannot control nine tenths," Davis 
appeared to have changed his mind sometime between mid-January 
and early May.
When the bill was first developed, reaction to Lincoln's 
plan, including the ten percent provision, was still relatively 
positive. It was not until the middle of February that prominent 
Radicals such as Benjamin F. Wade and Thaddeus Stevens began to 
complain that the lack of a majority government in the restored
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states would violate democratic principles. Perhaps detecting 
the drift of Congressional opinion away from the Presidential 
plan, Davis and his committee thought it wise to announce the new 
requirement before the vote was taken. Not only did the fifty 
percent provision directly challenge Presidential reconstruction, 
it made the impossibility of achieving restoration in any state 
before the war a virtual certainty. Considering the trouble 
Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana had in establishing a government 
with only ten percent of the 1860 voters required, it is obvious 
that fifty percent would be unattainable during war time.
As if to modify the Radical effects of the first amendment, 
Davis announced another proposed change for the bill. Rather 
than exclude all civil and military officers from voting or 
running for office, Davis1 second amendment reduced the number 
of those who would be ineligible. Davis proposed that only those 
holding positions above ministerial rank in civil government or 
Colonel in the military would be barred from participation in 
the restored state governments. Explaining the rationale for 
the amendment Davis declared that it "softens the operations of 
the clause excluding officers of the state and Confederate rebel 
governments, . . .  so that the exclusion merely operates on
Apersons of dangerous political influence." This reduction, 
theoretically, made more men eligible to meet the stringent 
fifty percent requirement. This conciliatory gesture on Davis' 
part, however, was essentially meaningless. Those officers who 
would now be qualified to vote would not be able to subscribe to
53
the loyalty oath. Obviously, if they had held even a very low 
ranking civil or military position they would have violated the 
terms of the oath. Unable to take the oath, these low ranking 
former confederates would be excluded from participating in the 
loyal state government, thus illustrating the insignificance of 
the proposed amendment.
The proposed amendments met with no opposition and were 
easily adopted by voice vote shortly after their introduction.
The new bill, with its amendments, was then approved by a vote 
of 73 to 59 on the same day, May 4. Following its passage in 
the House, the Davis bill was referred to the Senate Committee 
on Territories, chaired by Ohio Senator Benjamin F. Wade. After 
some delay, Wade introduced the bill into the Senate on May 27 
but it was not until July 1, three days prior to the end of the
Qfirst session, that the bill was considered.
In introducing the bill to the Senate, Wade expressed 
many of the points Davis had used in the House. Declaring that 
the Presidential ten percent plan would result in undemocratic 
governments, the Ohio Senator emphatically stated that "the 
Executive ought not to be permitted to handle this great question 
to his own liking."*-0 Following Wade's vehement defense of the 
bill, B. Gratz Brown, a Radical administration opponent from 
Missouri, proposed a substitute bill. This replacement would 
omit all of the specifics provided in the Davxs bill and simply 
prohibit the states in rebellion from casting votes for Presi­
dential electors or Congressional Representatives, until "the
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insurrection was suppressed and the people had returned to their
o b e d i e n c e . T h e  states would be declared loyal and allowed
to participate in national elections only by a "later act of 
12Congress." Surprisingly, this brief, general substitute 
passed by the close vote of 17 to 16. With the session nearing 
its close and the humid Washington weather stifling, Senators 
became restless and disinterested in the topic. Many did not 
even attend the last few days of the sessior. Distressed, Wade 
sent the significantly altered bill back to the House for 
approval. 3
On Saturday, July 2, the House considered the Senate 
version of the bill. With only one day left in the session, many 
Congressmen were tempted simply to agree with the Senate and work 
on a new, detailed bill in the next session. Davis, however, 
unwilling to let his bill die, persuaded the House to reject the 
Senate version. The same day, a conference committee was called. 
Wade, Davis and their committees met and it was decided that 
Wade would make an attempt to get the Senators to withdraw 
Brown's substitution. This tactic was successful, the withdrawal 
was made, and the Senate approved the House version of the bill 
by a vote of 18 to 14.
Once the Wade-Davis bill had been successfully approved, 
it was submitted to President Lincoln on the last day of the 
session, July 4, for his signature. Lincoln, however, neither 
signed nor vetoed the bill, thus Instituting a pocket veto. The 
Constitution states that if a bill is unsigned and Congress
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adjourns so the bill can't be returned, it fails to become a law;
15the President does not have to issue a formal veto. Because 
Lincoln had not criticlred the Wade-Davis bill during its 
progress through Congress, the President's exercise of the pocket 
veto came as a surprise.
In an almost unheard of gesture, Lincoln issued a procla­
mation on July 8 which explained his reasons for not supporting 
the Wade-Davis bill. He was "unprepared by a formal approval of
this Bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of
16restoration." Reluctant to approve the Congressional bill, 
Lincoln realized that the drastic differences between his plan 
and that of Wade and Davis would force Louisiana, Arkansas and 
Tennessee to start their reconstruction process over again. The 
Wade-Davis requirements of the iron-clad oath and the registra- 
t on of a majority of the 1860 electorate would dissolve the 
governments in the three states. Lincoln did not want to risk
1 7"repelling and discouraging the local citizens" who had first
formed loyal state governments. While he had reservations,
Lincoln claimed that he was "fully satisfied with the system for
restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for
18the loyal people of any state choosing to adopt it . . ." 
Characteristically flexible, Lincoln expressed his willingness 
to implement the Wade-Davis program if the citizens of the 
southern states preferred that plan. This offer, however, was 
meaningless because he had just pocket-vetoed the plan and thus 
prevented it from becoming law. Perhaps Lincoln was simply
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attempting to maintain party unity and demonstrate that he was 
not entirely opposed to the provisions in the Congressional 
reconstruction bill. With the Presidential election coming up 
in three months, Lincoln felt a need to explain his veto and 
express his willingness to be flexible.
The President's attempt to retain unity within his party,
however, was not well received by many Republicans. "What an
infamous proclamation!" Thaddeus Stevens fumed, "the idea of
pocketing a bill and then issuing a proclamation as to how far
he will conform to it, is matched only by signing a bill and
19then sending in a veto . . . "  Causing resentment rather than 
understanding, Lincoln's statement only served to fuel the 
already raging anger against him amongst Radical Republicans.
Wade and Davis felt it necessary to express their rage publicly. 
On August 5, the two Congressmen published a manifesto in the 
New York Tribune. This manifesto was particularly vicious in 
its denunciation of the President. Rarely, if ever, had such 
strong language been directed at a member of the same party 
through such a public medium as a newspaper.
Hoping to cause Lincoln to withdraw from the Presidential 
race in the face of their mounting criticism, Wade and Davis 
did their best in the manifesto to demonstrate the faults of 
Lincoln's plan. Providing a detailed list of differences between 
their plan and that of the President, Wade and Davis pointed out 
the dangers of the unstable, undemocratic state governments which 
would develop under the Presidential plan. In addition to the
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many flaws in Lincoln's restoration program, the authors
asserted, Lincoln did not have the authority to direct the
reconstruction process. Reiterating the Constitutional argument
used in the bill, the authors deemed the President's attempt to
direct reconstruction a use of "plenary dictatorial power."
Under Lincoln's plan, Hade and Davis claimed, slavery could still
exist. Only requiring adherence to the Emancipation Proclamation
in his loyalty oath, Lincoln could allow slavery to continue in
certain states. Hade and Davis worried that Lincoln's plan
"does not secure the abolition of slavery, for the proclamation
of freedom merely professed to free certain slaves, while it
recognizes the institution." Claiming that Lincoln's exclusion
of certain states form the Emancipation Proclamation could lead
to a revival of the institution, the Congressmen attempted to
20raise public indignation against the President.
In the manifesto, Hade and Davis also expressed suspicion 
about the President's reasons and motivations for refusing to 
sign their bill. Lincoln's assertion that he did not want to 
discourage the progress made toward reconstruction in Tennessee, 
Louisiana and Arkansas, Hade and Davis felt, was unjustified 
because these states did not have true governments, "They are 
mere creatures of his will. They cannot live a day without his 
support. They are mere oligarchies imposed on the people by 
military orders . . . "  In addition to calling the states Lincoln 
had retored "shadow governments," the Congressmen insisted that 
the veto was motivated by political aspirations. With the
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Presidential election coining in November, Hade and Davis 
asserted, Lincoln would need every electoral vote he could get.
If the restored states were allowed to participate in the elec­
tion, they would surely cast their votes for Lincoln. The 
manifesto claimed tha*-, "The President, by preventing this bill 
from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel 
states at the dictation of his personal ambition." Having 
severely criticized both Lincoln and his reconstruction programs, 
the authors warned that if the President wanted the support of
Radical Republicans in the future he had better "leave political
21reorganization to the Congress."
While many Republicans may have agreed with the individual 
points of the manifesto, most could not accept such scathing, 
public criticism of a member of their own party. In the con­
clusion of the document Wade and Davis wrote, "Such are the 
fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President, a blow at
the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity,
22and at the principles of republican government." Fuch an
unrestrained indictment, rather than increasing the movement
against Lincoln, drew supporters to his side. Faced with the
open criticism present in the manifesto, Republicans felt the
23necessity to express their support for Lincoln. Press reaction
to the Wade-Davis manifesto was also negative. The Chicago
Tribune called the statement "in very bad taste” and "hot-headed
24precipitancy." No prominent papers, not even the New York 
Tribune that had first printed the manifesto expressed support 
for the statement.
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The Radical attempt to discredit the President, then, 
failed. By harshly criticizing Lincoln, Wade and Davis had not 
eroded support for the President but, rather, had increased it. 
The Radical Republicans' failure to damage Lincoln's political 
reputation as well as encouraging developments in the war helped 




LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
While the Wade-Davis bill was being discussed in the 
Senate, Abraham Lincoln, in early June 1864, was chosen to be 
the Republican candidate for President. Earlier in the year, 
Lincoln's prospects for renomination had not appeared to be 
good. Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury in Lincoln's 
cabinet, had expressed his willingness to challenge Lincoln for 
the nomination. Chase later realized the lack of support for 
his candidacy and withdrew his name from consideration. Another 
Radical, John C. Fremont, was then the focus of Radical atten­
tion. Fremont had been the Republican parti first Presidential 
candidate in 1856 and he accepted the opprrt .ity to run for 
executive office again. Earlier in the war, General Fremont 
had been involved with the President in a major dispute over the 
military's right to free slaves in the departments they commanded. 
Eager to promote Radical ideals and a harsh punishment for the 
South, Fremont entered the political ring. Other Congressional 
Radicals, however, were unwilling to endorse, at least publicly, 
either of these potential candidates. Fearing that open opposi­
tion of the President would damage their support at home, 
especially among soldiers who were staunchly committed to Lincoln, 
most Congressmen decided to wait until a more opportune time to 
publicly endorse a replacement for the President.
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With most, prominent Republicans unwilling to oppose 
Lincoln's renomination publicly, the President had no trouble 
in obtaining his party's endorsement at the June convention.
At the Baltimore meeting, the Radical taction of the party did 
not heartily endorse Lincoln nor did they criticize him. Their 
hope of a failed renomination gone, Radicals felt the only way 
to be relieved of Lincoln's policies was to force him to step 
down before the election. The attempt to discredit Lincoln and 
erode his base of support with the Wade-Davis bill, how.<ver, 
was a miserable failure and, in fact, caused the President's 
political position to improve. The final end to Radical hopes, 
however, came when General William T. Sherman captured Atlanta 
in early September 1864. The victory signaled a certain Union 
triumph. The encouraging war news bolstered Lincoln's public 
support and effectively ended Radical attempts to unseat the 
President.2
Mow Lincoln only had to worry about his opponent from 
che Democratic Party, George B. McClellan. McClellan had, 
earlier in the war, been a very popular general, especially 
among his soxdiers. Lincoln feared that he might lose the race 
and all of his work be lost in the summer of 1864, when 
McClellan's support seemed to be increasing. With the September 
victory in Atlanta, however, Lincoln's momentum picked up and he 
won the November election by a considerable margin. Carrying 
every Union state except Delaware, New Jersey and Kentucky, 
Lincoln had 234 electoral votes to McClellan's 21.2
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Having succeeded in his re-elected bid, Lincoln was 
ready to move ahead with reconstruction. With the end of the 
war imminent, the President knew that seme workable plan had to 
be established whether it be the original he had proposed and 
implemented in Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee or some varia­
tion of it. In his annual Message to Congress on December 6, 
he expressed his realization that, "The Executive power itself 
would be greatly diminished by the cessation of actual war."' 
Knowing he could no longer act under the provision of war powers, 
Lincoln acknowledged that Congress, in the future, must play a 
greater role in reconstruction. The President, however, was not 
willing to give completely up his part in the process. "Pardons 
would still be within Executive control," he reminded Congress.
"In what spirit and temper this control would be executed can be
5fairly judged of by the past.” Warning Congress that in the 
next four years he was not going to allow Congress to control 
restoration exclusively, Lincoln announced his determination to 
keep the spirit of his plan intact.
Actually, the power struggle between the President and 
Congress seemed to be modifying in late 1864. A revised Wade- 
Davis bill had been introduced into the House which reflected a 
compromising spirit between Lincoln and the Radicals in Congress. 
The bill proposed Congressional recognition of the governments in 
Louisiana and Arkansas in return for Lincoln's acceptance of the 
Congressional plan for the other states. Although the bill was 
eventually tabled because some Radicals could not agree to
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recognize Louisiana and Arkansas, the c^fer of compromise demon­
strates a growing understanding between the President and the 
Radical faction of his party.
Further indication of Lincoln's future plans can be seen 
in a message he was prepared to send to Congress in early 
February 1865. On February 5, Lincoln showed the members of his 
cabinet a joint resolution which he planned to send to the 
national legislature. The resolution called for the appropria­
tion of four hundred million dollars to be distributed among the 
slates according to their pre-war slave population. Half of the 
state's allocation would be presented upon their surrender to 
Union forces, if they acted prior to April 1, 1865. The other 
half would be paid when the state ratified the Thirteenth 
Amendment, abolishing slavery throughout the country, which had 
been approved by Congress in late January. This ratification, 
however, would have to be completed by July 1, 1865. Reasoning 
that the money spent on additional months of war would equal the 
amount he was requesting, Lincoln was sure that this resoluti i 
would result in a rapid end to the conflict. His cabinet, 
however, encouraged Lincoln not to submit the resolution at hat 
time and Lincoln agreed. Nevertheless, the compensation prt?ram 
provided a hint of what Lincoln's future plans were. The 
President, apparently, realized the economic hardship both :.he 
war and the end to slavery vouli cause in the South, with iis 
usual conciliatory attitude, Lincoln wanted to help the people 
of the South avoid further hardship.*’
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On March 4, 1865, Abraham Lincoln delivered his Sacond 
Inaugural Address. As he had in the February 5 cabinet meeting, 
Lincoln adopted a very forgiving, generous attitude toward the 
South and encouraged others to do the same. "With malice toward 
none; with charity for all," Lincoln declared, "let us strive on 
to finish the work we are in . . .” Wanting the country to 
forget past differences and reunite, Lincoln urged the people,
"to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting 
peace among ourselves and with all nations.” The tone of 
Lincoln's address indicates his desire for a lenient reconstruc­
tion plan, such as the one he had already developed, one which 
would reconcile southern states with the Union as quickly as
7possible.
A final suggestion of Lincoln's future plans was included 
in an address he made to a group of serenaders on April 11, 1865. 
In the speech, Lincoln objected to the view that the seceding 
states had left the Union and must now undergo a rigorous process 
to be readmitted. Explaining that the question was not worth 
consideration, Lincoln told the serenaders, "Finding themselves 
safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had 
ever been abroad.” With the war about to end, Lincoln realized 
that many members of Congress wished to implement a reconstruc­
tion plan of their own. Distressed that a new plan might destroy 
all the progress he had made in a state such as Louisiana, the 
President warned of the consequences of such an action. "Now, 
a  <*e reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganise and
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disperse them." Wouldn't it be more useful, Lincoln asked, to
keep the governments already established and modify them to meet
new standards, rather them completely dissolving them? Desiring
to bring about unity and peace as soon as possible, Lincoln did
not want to lose the progress toward reconciliation which had
0already been made.
While he did not want those states currently being 
reorganized according to his plan to be set back, the President 
expressed his willingness to be flexible. When he found the 
current plan to be "adverse to the public interest,” Lincoln 
promised, a new program would be adopted. However, Lincoln 
stated, he had "not yet been so convinced." Although he was not 
ready to give up his plan, Lincoln realized that some changes 
might have to be made. Representatives from Louisiana, Tennessee 
and Arkansas were still denied admission to Congress; the states, 
therefore, were not yet fully restored, in this Last Public 
Address, Lincoln informed his audience that, "In the present 
'situation' as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some 
new announcement to the people of the South.” This new announce­
ment, however, was never made, for three days later Lincoln was
gassassinated at Ford's Theater.
Did Abraham Lincoln have a concrete, long term recon­
struction plan? The President certainly had a number of 
principles such as flexibility, expediency and concllliation 
toward the South which he adhered to unwaveringly. As to the 
plan itself, Lincoln felt his was the best that he could devise
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but, 48 he indicated a number of timer., he was always willing 
to consider other methods. As events in the last year of his 
life suggest, Lincoln realized that changes in the reconstruc­
tion program needed to be made. But, while he was willing to 
make modifications, Lincoln had indicated throughout his 
Presidency that he would not be willing to abandon the basic 
theory toward reconstruction he had established in order to make 
those changes. No one knows exactly what course Lincoln might 
have taken in the troubled post war years that lay ahead. One 
thing is certain, however, Lincoln would not have allowed his 
principles to be compromised.
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